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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

v.

:

ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO,

:

Case No. 20050976-CA

:

Defendant is not incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(2005). The Honorable Judge, Denise P. Lindberg, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah entered judgment of conviction for Communications Fraud, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) and Forgery, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) on October 7, 2005. A
copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she
failed to advise Mr. Tenorio that Forgery is a lesser included offense of Communications
Fraud and he pled guilty to both Forgery and Communications Fraud and by advising Mr.
Tenorio to plead guilty to Forgery when the state presented insufficient evidence to prove
all the elements of Forgery under well established Utah law and whether the ineffective

representation constitutes exceptional circumstances when same counsel represented Mr.
Tenorio at plea hearing as at sentencing.
Standard of Review: Utah courts review ineffective assistance of counsel claims
raised for the first time on appeal for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 13,
55 P.3d 1131. "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device/ to
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on
appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "'[Exceptional
circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of
fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's
judgment that even though an issue was not raised below . . . unique procedural
circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." Id.
Preservation: This is an ineffective assistance of counsel and exceptional
circumstances claim and so is not preserved.
Issue 2. Whether the trial court committed plain error by accepting Mr. Tenorio's
guilty plea without establishing a factual basis for the charges and by failing to personally
ensure that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements of the charges in relation to the facts in
violation of rule 11.
Standard of Review: "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that
'(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant.' "State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, U 3, 113 P.3d 998
(quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,U 15, 95 P.3d 276)(other citations omitted).
Preservation: This is a plain error claim and so is not preserved.
Issue 3: Whether current interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) which
precludes review for ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and exceptional
circumstances claims on direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty

2

plea violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees
the right to counsel and the due process clause of the federal constitution.
Standard of Review: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of
law, which [are reviewed] for correctness." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^j 42, 99 P.3d
820 (quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, If 5, 86 P.3d 735) (citations
omitted)). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute "bear[s] the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality."
Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 42 (quoting Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819
(Utah 1991)). Moreover, [t]he constitution tolerates a greater degree of vagueness in
civil statutes than in criminal statutes. Green, 2004 UT 76, &43 (citing Vill. of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71
L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)).
Preservation: This is an ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and
exceptional circumstances claim and so is not preserved.

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statute is in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999);Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-303 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 2, 2004, Mr. Tenorio was charged by information with one count of
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10801 (1999) or in the alternative, Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999) and one count of Forgery, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). R.3-8. Trial counsel entered an
appearance on Mr. Tenorio's behalf on September 14, 2004. R.19. On January 28, 2005,
Mr. Tenorio entered a not guilty plea for both charges. A preliminary hearing was held
3

on January 6, 2005 and a jury trial was scheduled on April 26, 2005. R.277, 278. On
April 22, 2005, four days prior to the scheduled trial, Mr. Tenorio changed his plea and
entered guilty pleas to both counts as charged. R. 161-174; 184-185. Mr. Tenorio, still
represented by the same trial counsel, never moved to withdraw his guilty plea and was
sentenced on October 7, 2005. At this sentencing hearing, Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel
attempted to withdraw as counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state's evidence
The evidence presented by the state at the preliminary hearing consists of the
following: Mr. Tenorio secured a mortgage loan through HUD on January 28, 1999 in
the amount of $ 83,871.00. R.277: 6-7. Mr. Tenorio defaulted on the loan and HUD, as
an insurer on the loan, claimed a loss of $50,817.00 after it resold the property minus all
expenses it expended on the property. Id. at 8.
The state called as a witness Ray Mudrow, the loan originator from AccuBank
Mortgage who helped Mr. Tenorio obtain the mortgage loan. Id. at 10-11. Mr. Mudrow
testified that his duties as a loan originator involve sitting down with the borrower and
filling out the application, getting a copy of the borrower's "green card, alien card or
driver's license and social security card." Id. at 11. Mr. Mudrow testified that on the
loan application the borrower must disclose his or her name and social security number.
Id. at 14. In addition, the borrower signs the application at closing. Id. During the loan
process, the mortgage bank also obtains a verification of employment from the
borrower's employer. Id. at 15. Mr. Mudrow testified that all of these procedures were
followed when Mr. Tenorio closed on his loan and that Mr. Tenorio provided a copy of
his social security card. Id. at 17.
Kevin Shoell, a licensed escrow officer for Title One, testified that he did a closing
with Mr. Tenorio in relation to this mortgage loan and property on January 28, 1999 in
Murray, Utah. Id. at 24. Mr. Shoell testified that Mr. Tenorio executed the closing
4

documents in his presence. Id. Mr. Shoell testified that he would have checked Mr.
Tenorio's identification, such as his driver's license at the time of closing. Id. at 25. In
addition, Lisa Wodja, a special agent for the Social Security Administration, testified that
she investigated Mr. Tenorio's Uniform Residential Loan Application. Id. at 31-32. Ms.
Wodja testified that as part of this investigation she verified that the social security
number Mr. Tenorio used on the loan application did not belong to him. Id. at 32. She
testified that the social security number was validly issued, but to another individual who
was alive when the loan closing took place, but was deceased by the time of the
preliminary hearing Id. at 32-33.
Michael Lowder of the Social Security Administration also investigated Mr.
Tenorio's use of the particular social security number indicated on the loan application
and testified at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 34. In relation to this, Mr. Lowder
interviewed Mr. Tenorio about the use of the social security number. Id. at 35. Mr.
Lowder testified that Mr. Tenorio stated that the social security number was given to him
by a gentleman on the street in 1996 so that Mr. Tenorio, who is in this country illegally,
could gain employment. Id. Mr. Lowder testified that Mr. Tenorio admitted that he
knew using the social security number was wrong. Id. Additionally, Mr. Lowder
testified that Mr. Tenorio acknowledged signing the loan application. Id. at 36. Mr.
Tenorio signed his own name to the mortgage loan application and related documentation
and signed his own name on the social security card. See R. 276: 22 (Trial Court: "Using
his own name but this fake social security number"); R. 3-8.
At the preliminary hearing defense counsel argued, among other things that the
state did not establish a prima facie case of communications fraud because it failed to
present evidence that Mr, Tenorio devised a scheme or artifice. Id. at 46. The state
responded by claiming that it had established the communications fraud charge because
Mr. Tenorio obtained a loan through the scheme or artifice with "the presentment of a
forged social security card along with the representation that he was in fact a legal citizen
5

and entitled to use that card and number." Id. at 47. The trial court found probable cause
to bind the case over on the communications fraud count and the forgery count. Id. at 51.
Trial counsel's representation
During the course of her representation, defense counsel submitted four motions,
one of which included a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. R. 61-64; 65-68; 7779, 102-103. Defense counsel formally withdrew two of these motions. R. 104-106;
107-109. On March 23, 2005, the state responded to defense counsel's motion to
establish which of alternative charges plaintiff will pursue, concluding:
The defendant has, without basis in the law, requested that the State be required to
choose which of alternative charges it will be arguing at trial. The appropriateness
of the State's action in charging in the alternative is well-established by both
statute and Utah case law. Moreover, the defendant has not supported his motion
with any case law or analysis suggesting that charging in the alternative is
improper. Such a motion, wholly unsupported by either law or analysis, is
improper and could warrant appropriate sanctions.
R. 92. In response to defense counsel's motion to establish valuation on March 23, 2005,
the state concluded: "[t]he defendant's request for additional hearings is unsupported by
any authority, an abuse of the judicial process, a waste of time and needless presentation
of cumulative evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." R. 96. On
March 30, 2005, defense counsel submitted a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel.
R. 102. On March 31, 2005, defense counsel filed with the court withdrawals of her prior
motions to establish which of alternative charges plaintiff will pursue and motion to
establish valuation and of request for hearing. R. 104; 107.
On April 15, 2005, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude statements
allegedly made by defendant July 30, 2003; August 7, 2003; June 30, 2004; and July 9,
2004. R. 131; 149-150. The state responded to this motion on April 21, 2005. R.175-
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177. In its response, the state first argued that the appropriate motion for the defense to
have brought was a motion to suppress under Rule 12 of Criminal Procedure. R. 175-76.
Second, the state argued that it was entitled to five days notice in advance of trial for such
amotion. R. 176.
Third, it is troubling to observe that the certificate of mailing attached to
defendant's motion is dated April 15, 2005, and was signed by the attorney for the
defendant as having been mailed that day. In fact, the envelope addressed to the
State in which the motion was received, is postmarked April 18, 2005. Even if the
State had received the motion on the same date it was mailed it would not have
given the required five days notice.
R. 176-77. At no time during the course of her representation did counsel challenge the
propriety of the forgery charge or argue that forgery could be a lesser included offense to
the charge of communications fraud under Utah law to the trial court. R. 276:1-37. Nor
did trial counsel ever advise Mr. Tenorio of such possibilities under Utah law. Instead,
counsel focused on issues irrelevant to the charges her client was facing. For instance, at
the change of plea hearing, counsel articulated to the trial court:
Were we to argue this, we would argue that he lacked the intent to cause this and
did not intentionally default on the house. He lived there for years and made
various improvements. It happened to many people unfortunately, could not Trial Court: The issue is not that he intended to default on the house. The issue is
that he intended to and in fact did use information that didn't belong to him to
secure a loan in which he then was unable to maintain, right?
R.276:22-23.
The plea colloquy
On April 22, 2005, just four days before trial, Mr. Tenorio changed his plea from
not guilty to guilty to all counts as charged. R. 276:19-31. The state explained the terms
of the plea agreement to the trial court and the trial court attempted to sort through the
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facts of the case. Id. at 22. The state explained to the court that Mr. Tenorio was using a
social security card that legally belonged to another person he had purchased off of the
street after arriving to America. Id. The trial court specifically commented: "[ujsing his
own name but this fake social security number, this other person's, deceased person's
social security number." Id. The state explained that Mr. Tenorio used the "forged social
security card" to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently
defaulted on. Id.
Defense counsel argued on behalf of Mr. Tenorio the following:
Defense:. . . I have advised him of the consequences of coming back to this country after
deportation is fatal. Not only would he be forced to serve out whatever sentence he
would have remaining on these charges but then of course he would be in serious trouble
with the United States and would face consequences separate from these charges here.
He's been in this country, working hard, does not have a criminal record. He basically is
here working and lacked the intent to defraud. He was a—
Trial Court: Well, if he lacked the intent to defraud, whey are we pleading? Why aren't
we going to trial on Tuesday and he has the right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury
and let the matter be a matter of proof for the State.
Defense: Well, that is true. Forgive me Your Honor, are you asking me to—I know that
my client if he pleads guilty needs to make a statement to the Court about what he is
pleading guilty to.
Trial Court: Correct.
Defense: We can do that.
Id. at 23-24. The trial court then addressed Mr. Tenorio:
Trial Court: Mr. Osorio, do you understand that you are set for trial this coming Tuesday
and you would have the right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury? You would have
the right at trial to be represented by counsel. It would be the State's burden to prove you
guilty of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt and you would be presumed innocent
and the jury would be instructed that they must begin the trial with that presumption.
At trial, you would have the right to confront and cross examine witnesses against you,
subpoena your own witnesses to appear and testify and if a jury convicted you, you
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would have a right to appeal. Now, by entering this plea, you would be giving up many
of those rights most of those rights and you would be severely limiting your appeal rights.
Now those rights are explained in more detail in that yellow document that your attorney
has there that is written in both English and Spanish. Did you have a chance to read it
over or review it with your attorney? Senior Osorio?1

Mr. Tenorio expressed hesitance in pleading guilty and so the trial court allowed
for Mr. Tenorio to review the plea affidavit.

After the brief recess, Mr. Tenorio pled

guilty to both counts as charged.
In accepting the guilty plea, the trial court explained the charges as following:
By your plea - and let me just get to the information here - by your plea, you
would be admitting that beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake
County you devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and the
Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them money, property, or
anything else of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions. And you communicated directly or indirectly
with other people in order to execute or conceal the scheme. What's more, in
connection with the scheme, you obtained property that was worth more than $
5,000.
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a
purpose to defraud or understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the act of somebody
else3.
Id. at 27.
The state explained its evidence as following:

1

The Trial Court frequently referred to Mr. Robert Osorio Tenorio as Mr. Osorio. For
ease and to avoid confusion appellate counsel uses the party name Tenorio throughout
this appeal.
2
The Plea Affidavit is attached as Addendum C; The plea affidavit does not list the
elements of forgery or communications fraud, nor do the facts ever relate to those
specific elements.
3
The entire plea colloquy is not represented in these facts, but the relevant portions to this
appeal. However, the full transcript will be added as addendum for this Court to review
thoroughly.
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What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that. The loan packet included that
social security number within it and the defendant signed indicating it was indeed
his social security number. That loan went through the process for approximately
two months during which the defendant provided additional information like
where he worked. That information also contained the social security number on
it. At the end of that period if [sic] then went to a closing where again the
defendant represented that that was his social security number and the loan was
closed. The mortgage officer nor the title officer would have proceeded with any
of it if they had known that that wasn't his social security number and the loan
would not have closed. The loan was closed, he received a loan in the amount of $
80,000 some odd which was HUD guaranteed. He paid on the loan for a period of
time, I think it was approximately two years, I'm not positive. At that time the
loan went into default and the house was foreclosed and HUD honored their
guaranteed [sic] and paid out approximately $ 50,000 some odd which we have
specified the exact amount in the plea agreement. That would be the State's
evidence.
Id. at 28-29. The trial court commented: "[a]ll right. Those facts support the plea that
has been entered." Id. at 29.
Based on the guilty plea, on July, 22, 2005 the trial court sentenced Mr. Tenorio to
a term of 365 days for the communications fraud conviction and to a term of 365 days for
the forgery conviction, with the total time suspended. R. 198. In addition, the trial court
ordered restitution in the amount of $ 50, 817.00 plus interest to be paid in behalf of
HUD. Id. On October 7, 2005, on the state's motion to correct the sentence, the trial
court altered its prior sentence to reflect suspended terms of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison for the third degree forgery conviction and one to fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison for the second degree communications fraud conviction. R.200-201.
Defense counsel opposed such motion based on the oral announcement of the sentence on
July 22, 2005. R. 223. On October 7, 2005 the trial court pronounced sentence as an
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at Utah State Prison for the communications
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fraud conviction and zero to five years at the Utah State Prison for the forgery conviction,
with both terms suspended on condition of one year probation which would be stayed if
Mr. Tenorio surrendered to ICE. R. 276:39.
The trial court altered the sentence on its own motion, welcoming the defendant to
take the issue up on appeal. Id. At this time, defense counsel requested to withdraw as
counsel. Id. The trial court stated: "[a]t this point I'm not prepared to entertain any
Motion to Withdraw until the 30-day appeal period has run. You can discuss with your
client whether or not an appeal is warranted, what the chances of success on an appeal
are, explore with him what his views are about that but I'm not going to leave him
unrepresented at the last minute until he has full opportunity to decide what he's going to
do with the Court's judgment." Id. at 39-40. Defendant had the same counsel at the
change of plea hearing as he did at sentencing and did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea during this time frame. Defendant filed an Affidavit of Indigency on October 18,
2005. R. 255-258. Based on the trial court's order appointing counsel, appellate counsel
entered appearance on November 1, 2006. This appeal follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Tenorio can show on the face of the record ineffective assistance of counsel,
exceptional circumstances, and that the trial court committed plain error. This Court
should allow for direct appellate review to cure constitutional defects, to avoid manifest
injustice, and to comport with the demands of due process.
The current state of the law in Utah regarding the right to appeal a guilty plea that
was rendered on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is constitutionally
inadequate. When a defendant does not have the legal savvy, nor the effective assistance
of counsel, to move to withdraw an invalid guilty plea before sentencing, it leaves such
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defendants without the constitutionally demanded appeal of right, the assistance of
effective counsel for trial and direct appeal, and leaves this Court without jurisdiction to
remedy such constitutional defects.
Other areas of the law allow for this Court to hear an ineffective assistance claim
even if it wasn't properly preserved below based on the rare procedural anomaly that
often times a defendant who receives ineffective assistance is with that same ineffective
counsel throughout all legal proceedings where such claims can be remedied. This Court
has recognized that a defendant cannot be responsible to preserve such claims because it
is not likely that incompetent counsel will advise the defendant of such defects. For
defendants who are rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at a plea hearing in which
they plead guilty throughout sentencing, the same policy should apply and the same
protections are needed.
While current statutory interpretation does not allow this Court jurisdiction to
remedy these constitutionally defective pleas, the constitutions of the United States and
Utah demand such a policy to protect the constitutional right of all defendants to the
effective assistance of counsel and right to a full and fair appeal. It is not enough that a
defendant can pursue a withdrawal of his or her guilty plea in post-conviction
proceedings because such defendants have been denied the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel throughout all critical stages of their case in such a manner
that ultimately deprives them of the right to remedy such defects in direct appeal aided by
the effective assistance of counsel.
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The Utah Supreme Court decision State v. Reyes. 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630 did
not directly hold that a defendant on direct appeal from a criminal conviction could not
claim ineffective assistance or argue plain error in taking the plea. To the extent Reyes
and other supreme court cases have been read as precluding plain error or ineffective
assistance claims when a defendant has not timely moved to withdraw a guilty plea, such
decisions depart from established case law that protect these constitutional rights.
Current interpretation of Reyes allows for constitutional violations and, as such, this
Court is empowered to interpret the withdrawal statute in accordance with the demands
of the United States and Utah Constitution. Moreover, this Court should overturn case
law from this Court that obliterates review for plain error, ineffective assistance, and
exceptional circumstances for timely direct appeals of the guilty plea conviction in order
to comport with constitutional requirements.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE ON THE FACE OF THE
RECORD WHEN SHE ADVISED MR. TENORIO TO PLEAD TO THE FORGERY
AND COMMUNICATION COUNTS AS CHARGED AND THE SAME
INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION FROM THE GUILTY PLEA TO SENTENCING
IS A RARE PROCEDURAL ANOMALY QUALIFYING AS EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Utah courts apply the Strickland test to challenges to guilty pleas based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^[16, 26 P.3d 203 (citing
Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).The Supreme
Court held in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25
L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), that the guarantee to the assistance of counsel in the Sixth
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amendment would be hollow if defendants were "left to the mercies of incompetent
counsel." Id. The two -pronged effectiveness test announced in Strickland v.
Washington, was derived from this principle. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, "an individual has been denied effective
assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced
the defendant." Martinez, 2001 UT 12, If 16 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
More specifically "[w]here a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show a 'reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 22 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516, 525 (Utah 1994)). Therefore, "counsel's deficient performance must have affected
the outcome of the plea process." Id. (citation omitted). "In determining whether
counsel's performance was deficient, [Utah courts] . . . 'presume that counsel has
rendered adequate assistance. . . . Thus, if the challenged act or omission might be
considered sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of
counsel.'" Id. Moreover, "exceptional circumstances . . . serves as a 'safety device,' to
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on
appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(citation omitted).
'"[Exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed
in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate
court's judgment that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the
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plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. Id. This exception applies to these
claims because Mr. Tenorio was represented by the same ineffective counsel at the plea
hearing who rendered ineffective advice concerning the charges and plea as he was at
sentencing. In order for these issues to have been preserved, and in order for Mr. Tenorio
to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 his counsel would have had to have moved to
withdraw the guilty plea based on her own ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. MR. TENORIO'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S SPECIFIC ACTS OR OMISSIONS
FELL BELOW THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE PROFESSIONAL
ASSISTANCE WHEN SHE DID NOT ARGUE NOR ADVISE THE CLIENT
THE STATE HAD INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A
FORGERY CONVICTION.
Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to reasonably investigate the law of
forgery in Utah and advised Mr. Tenorio to plead to both counts as charged even though
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and outlined at the plea hearing did not
support all of the elements of forgery. Mr. Tenorio was prejudiced by accepting
counsel's ineffective legal advice and pleading guilty to both counts as charged. In order
to establish a forgery charge, the state was required to prove:
(1)

A person us guilty of forgery, if with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
15

sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
so such original existed.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1999)(emphasis added). In addition, Utah case law
construing this statute, establishes that one cannot be convicted of forgery if he or she
signs the relevant document with his or her own name and is not purporting to be another
person with the same name. See State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, ^ 15, 105 P.3d 951.
Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel failed to gain knowledge of the law of the specific crimes
of which her client was charged. Clients are entitled to competent legal advice during the
pretrial proceedings, including during plea negotiations. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52 (1985);
Martinez, 2001 UT 12; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994). The United States
Supreme Court has stated that:
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and
enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends
on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases."
Lockhart 474 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted). "Knowledge of the law is a basic
prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not investigate
clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective assistance."
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
645-46 (Utah 1996)).
Moreover, the American Bar Association's ethical standards on the "Defense
Function" provide that:
after informing himself fully on the facts in the law, defense counsel should advise
the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including his
candid estimate of the probable outcome, and that it is unprofessional conduct for
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a lawyer to understate or overstate the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case in
order to exert undue influence on the defendant's decision with regard to pleading.
ABA Standards, The Defense Function § 5.1(a,b). Also section 6.1 states:
that when the attorney concludes on the basis of full investigation and study that
under the controlling law and the evidence of a conviction is probable, he should
so advise the defendant and seek his consent to engage in plea discussions with the
prosecutor, if such course appears desirable.
Finally, the ABA Standards, "Pleas of Guilty," § 3.2(b), provides that in order to aid the
accused in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, should
advise him of the available alternatives and of the considerations deemed important by
counsel or the accused in reaching a decision.
Thus, Utah law and the ABA standards require that in order to render effective
assistance, counsel must gain adequate knowledge of the crimes of which her client is
being charged. The record reveals that Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel did not gain necessary
knowledge of the required elements of forgery in order to effectively assist her client.
Utah courts will not assume, outside the record, that attorneys have fully advised their
clients of such inadequacies: "[t]he law will not assume that counsel has advised his
client of his inadequacies or those of his associates." State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699
(Utah 1980).
This Court "has emphasized that in forgery prosecutions the State must prove that
the defendant used the name of another." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, If 11; 105
P.3d 951 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)('"The
state must show that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must also show
that [she] did so without any authority to do so.'"). Mr. Tenorio signed his own name on
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all relevant documentation in this case. The state failed to demonstrate even one instance
where Mr. Tenorio used the name of another or that Mr. Tenorio was purporting to be
another with the same name. Defense counsel did not make one argument concerning the
evidence the state presented to establish the forgery charge. In this case a reasonable
investigation would have alerted counsel that her client was facing an erroneous charge
of which the state had insufficient evidence to prove.
The fact that Mr. Tenorio used a social security number that he had no authority to
use does not render his action of signing his own name to the card and loan
documentation a forgery. Accord Jensen, 2004 UT App 467 at ^ 10-15. In Jensen, the
defendant signed his own name on a deed for a company of which he had no authority to
sign in that capacity. Id. at ^14. The defendant was charged with forgery and fraudulent
handling of records and after a jury trial was convicted of both charges. Id. at ^ 5. The
evidence the state presented to the jury to establish the forgery charge was that the
defendant signed his true name on a deed in a capacity of which he had no authority. Id.
at If 4.
This Court reversed the forgery charge stating "'it is well established that forgery
contemplates a writing which falsely purports to be the writing of another person than the
actual maker.5" Id. at Tf 11 (quoting Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th
Cir. 1948)). This Court stated that the defendant "signed his own name to the Deed on
the line reserved for BE and added the words 'see lease.5 Consequently, [the defendant]
did not make an instrument purporting to be the act of another." Id. at ^f 15.
Accordingly, this Court reversed the forgery conviction. Id. Likewise, in this case, Mr.
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Tenorio signed his own true name to the social security card and to the loan
documentation. While Mr. Tenorio did not have the authority or right to use the social
security number, that does not render his action a forgery. Thus, the guilty plea and
resulting forgery conviction in this case prejudiced Mr. Tenorio.
Additionally, in Jensen this Court cited to other jurisdictions with statutes similar
to the Utah statute that have held that when a defendant signs his or her own true name to
a document, even if it is in a fraudulent capacity, that signature does not support a charge
of forgery. For instance in Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1976), the Texas
Court of Appeals held that "one who signs his true name, and does not represent himself
to be someone else of the same name, does not commit a forgery because his act does not
purport to be that of another." Id. at 926. The court stated that while the defendant "may
[have been] guilty of falsely representing the power under which he executed the
instrument... he did not represent his act to be that of another. Id.
Likewise, in People v. Mann. 75 N.Y.484, 486 (N.Y. 1878), the New York Court
of Appeals distinguished purporting to be the act of another, a required element for
forgery, from the false assumption of authority:
One who makes an instrument signed with his own name, but purporting to bind
another, does not make an instrument purporting to be the act of another . . . The
instrument shows upon its face that it is made by himself and is in point of fact his
own act. The wrong done . . . consists in the false assumption of authority to bind
another...
Id. at 486-87. The New York Court of Appeals has also recently supported this
proposition of law when it held "it is not forgery for a person to sign his own name to an
instrument, and falsely and fraudulently represent that he has authority to bind another by
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doing so"; "the signer is guilty of false pretenses only." People v. Cunningham, 813
N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 2004). The court further stated "under our present Penal law, as
under prior statutes and the common law, a distinction must be drawn between an
instrument which is falsely made, altered or completed, and an instrument which contains
misrepresentations not relevant to the identity of the maker or drawer of the instrument."
Id. at 893.
Not only is it Utah law that when a defendant signs his own true name to a
document it is not forgery, it is the long standing rule. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin,
77 Mass. 197, 198 (Mass. 1858)("As a general rule however, to constitute forgery, the
writing falsely made must purport to be the writing of another party than the person
making it."); State v. Young, 46 N.H. 266 (N.H. 1865)("For Lord Coke in his Institutes
says, as we have before seen, that forgery 'is properly taken where the act is done in the
name ofanother person. '"(emphasis in original)); Commonwealth v. Apalakis, 396 Mass.
292, 297 n.6 (Mass. 1985)("forgery is committed either by falsely creating or making a
legal instrument or by materially altering it with the intent to deceive. The writing itself
must be false and hence a writing which is otherwise genuine but which contains false
statements made with intent to deceive is not a forgery because the instrument itself is not
false, but rather the statements therein. Accordingly, not every fraudulent instrument is a
forgery."(quoting J.R. Nolan, Criminal Law § 382, 224 (1976)(emphasis in original));
People v. Cunningham, 813 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004)(same); People v. Mann,
75 N.Y. 484 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1878)(same); Lusitania Savings Bank, FSB v. Progressive
Casualty Insurance Company, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13331 (3rd Cir.
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2005)(memorandum decision)(same); State v. Lamb, 152 S.E. 154,155 (N.C. 1930)("It
would be difficult to frame a definition to include all possible cases; but as a rule the false
writing must purport to be the writing of a party other than the one who makes it and it
must indicate an attempted deception of similarity."); Reese v. State, 378 A.2d 4, 7 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1977)("It is forgery to sign another man's name to a note, without
authority and with intent to defraud . . . but it is not forgery for a person to sign his own
name to an instrument, and falsely and fraudulently represent that he has authority to bind
another . . . " ) ; State v. Taylor, 16 So. 190 (La. 1894)(Same); Charter Bank Northwest v.
Evanston Insurance Company, 791 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1986)("one who signs his own
true name does not commit forger, even where acting as an agent without actual
authority: 'while the alleged agent may be culpable for his fraud he has not committed a
forgery.'"); Graham v. State, 51 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932)(same); State v.
Ferguson, 234 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967)(same); Bank of Detroit v. Standard
Accident Insurance Co., 222 N.W. 134, 135 (Mich. 1928)("The law, as we have seen, is
well settled that if a person sign an instrument with his own name per procuration of the
party whom he intends or pretends to represent, it is no forgery, it is no false making of
the instrument, but merely a false assumption of authority."(emphasis in original)); State
v. Schoelerman,315 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa 1982)(same); State v. Blake, 760 P.2d 1369 (Ore.
Ct.App. 1988)(same).
Trial counsel never moved to have the forgery charge dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence, never argued to the trial court concerning the validity of the forgery
charge, and never advised Mr. Tenorio that the state's evidence was lacking in order to
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support a forgery charge. Yet trial counsel represented Mr. Tenorio from September 14,
2004 until October 18, 2005. R.19. This Court issued its Jensen decision, clearly on
point, on December 16, 2004. See Jensen, 2004 UT App 467. Mr. Tenorio pled guilty to
this charge on April 22, 2005, just four days before his scheduled jury trial and more than
four months after Jensen was issued. Even more egregious is the fact that earlier
language in Utah cases and the long standing rule in a majority of jurisdictions hold that
one cannot be guilty of a forgery when they sign their own true name to documentation.
See State v.Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, trial counsel's
lack of knowledge of the law of forgery fell below the standard of reasonable
professional assistance. Accord Ross, 951 P.2d at 246 ("Knowledge of the law is a basic
prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not investigate
clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective
assistance."(titations omitted)). In order to demonstrate prejudice for ineffective advice
on a guilty plea, Mr. Tenorio must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for
the error. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 22. In this case, it was factually impossible that Mr.
Tenorio committed forgery, yet based on his attorney's advice he pled guilty as charged
to the forgery count and was accordingly prejudiced.
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ADVISING DEFENDANT
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO BOTH COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND
FORGERY WHEN FORGERY IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.
Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Mr. Tenorio in regards to the
plea agreement, that under the circumstances of his case, the forgery charge was a lesser
included offense to communications fraud and the state could not have lawfully convicted
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Mr. Tenorio of both counts. Under the state's theory and evidence of this case, forgery
was a lesser included offense of communications fraud.4 Utah Code Annotated §76-1402(1) provides that:
(1)
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
Id. Case law has interpreted that "[t]he prohibition on conviction for lesser-included
offenses flows from the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States
Constitutions." Ross, 952 P.2d at 241. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("Nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.5'); U.S. Const, amend. V ("Nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
Utah courts employ a two-pronged analysis in order to identify lesser-included
offenses. See Ross, 952 P.2d at 241; State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983); State v.
Knight 2003 UT App 354, If 9, 79 P.3d 969; State v. Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, If 12, 12
P.3d 103; State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, If 9, 122 P.3d 615; State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
f 1 6 , 994 P.2d 1243, First, Utah courts will determine whether the lesser included
offense is "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
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Additionally, counsel was ineffective for advising Mr. Tenorio to plead as charged to
the communications fraud count when there was a facial validity challenge to the
communications fraud statute for vagueness at the time of the plea hearing. See State v.
Norns, Case No. 20040880-SC; State v. Norris, Case No. 20041118-SC. Failure to
advise Mr. Tenorio that there was a constitutional challenge prejudice Appellant since he
pled guilty as charged to both counts despite a question as to the constitutional validity of
the communications fraud statute.
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the commission of the offense charged." Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. "If the two crimes are
'such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the
lesser/ then the lesser offense 'merges into the greater crime and the state cannot convict
and punish the defendant for both offenses."5 Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. While in most
cases this determination can be affected by comparing the statutory elements of both
crimes, in cases where the two crimes have "multiple variations, [Utah courts] look
beyond the statutory elements and 'consider the evidence to determine whether the
greater-lesser relationship exists. '" Id.
To establish communications fraud, the state was required to prove the following:
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1999).
To establish forgery, the state was required to prove the following:
(1)
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
no such original existed.

24

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999).
This Court noted in Ross that "some variations of communications fraud clearly
include forgery." Ross, 951 P.2d at 242. In Ross the state presented evidence that
showed that the defendant was involved in a check cashing scheme in which the
defendant and a man identified as "Nikki" would pick up a female accomplice and hand
her a forged check. Id. at 237. They would drive to a store and then the female would
cash the forged check and then the three would split the proceeds. Id. This Court held
that on these facts "element one of the third degree forgery is clearly included in element
one of second degree communications fraud; once the jury had found that defendant had
'devised a scheme to defraud,' it could not avoid finding that defendant had 'knowledge
that he was facilitating a fraud.'" Id. at 242.
Likewise, in this case, the state explained its evidence to prove the counts of
forgery and communications fraud as following:
What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that.
R.276: 28-29. (emphasis added). Additionally, the plea affidavit states:
I presented a forged social security card to a mortgage lender and represented that
number belonged to me to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan in the amount of 83,871
to purchase a house. The above events occurredon January 28, 1998, in SL County
Utah.
R. 163. Thus, just like in Ross, in this case the state attempted to prove that "element one
of the third degree forgery is clearly included in element one of second degree
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communications fraud;" once the state attempted to establish that the defendant had
"devised a scheme to defraud," it also attempted to establish, through the same proof, that
defendant had "knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud/" Id. at 242. The state
attempted to prove the scheme to defraud and the knowledge that Mr. Tenorio was
facilitating a fraud by showing that Mr. Tenorio obtained a false social security card.
Moreover, the social security card itself, with Mr. Tenorio5s signature, is the alleged
forged writing and that very same card is the fraudulent representation in order to
establish the communications fraud charge.
Indeed the facts of this case are similar to the variation this Court articulated in
Ross that demonstrates forgery can be a lesser included offense to communications fraud.
This Court stated:
the State might prove a defendant committed communications fraud by showing
that: (1) a defendant devised a scheme to defraud that involved passing forged
checks; (2) the defendant communicated with another person for the purpose of
executing the scheme by uttering or transferring a forged check worth at least
$100, and; (3) the forgery, which requires only that a defendant knowingly utter a
forged check worth over $100, would be established by 'proof of the same or less
than all the facts" required to prove second degree communications fraud.
Id. at 242. In this case, the state attempted to prove (1) that Mr. Tenorio devised a
scheme to defraud by obtaining and signing a social security card with a number that was
issued to another individual; (2) that Mr. Tenorio communicated with another person for
the purpose of executing the scheme by presenting the signed social security card to
AccuBank Mortgage in order to obtain a loan, and (3) the "forged" social security card
would be established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove
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communications fraud. Consequently, like in Ross, in this case, Mr. Tenorio's forgery
conviction was a lesser included offense to his communications fraud conviction.
Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel was ineffective when she did not inform Mr. Tenorio
that the alleged forgery was a lesser included offense under the facts of this case.
"Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If
an attorney does not investigate clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed
to provide effective assistance of counsel." Ross, 951 P.2d at 246 (citations omitted). As
demonstrated supra at Point 1(a), trial counsel neither moved the trial court for dismissal
of the forgery count as it was a lesser included offense of communications fraud, nor
advised Mr. Tenorio of such when advising him of the plea. Just like in Ross, in this case
a reasonable investigation would have alerted counsel that her client might be facing
double jeopardy. See id. The same rationale this Court employed in Ross is directly
applicable to this case:
First, section 76-1-402(3)(a) states that a crime is a lesser-included offense when
"it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the greater offense." Second, Hill clearly established that when
crimes have multiple variations, some variations may be lesser-included offenses.
See Hill, 674 P.2d at 98. Third, Bradley laid out a test under which defendant's
forgery charges were lesser-included offenses on the facts the State presented at
trial. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) at 878. Fourth, the State in
this case consistently argued a theory of defendant's crime in which the forgery
counts were proven by fewer than all the elements required to prove
communications fraud.
Id. Even more compelling, is the fact that Ross, a case directly on point to this case, was
issued from this Court on December 26, 1997, nearly seven and a half years prior to Mr.
Tenorio entering his guilty plea on April 22, 2005. See Ross, 951 P.2d 236. This Court
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found that a similar error by counsel in Ross "fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional competence" and Mr. Tenorio respectfully requests that this
Court so find in this case. Ross, 951 P.2d at 246.
"When a defendant has been improperly convicted of both a greater and a lesser
offense, it is appropriate to regard the conviction of the lesser offense as mere surplusage,
which does not invalidate the conviction and sentence on the greater offense." Id.
(quoting Hill 674 P.2d at 98.). Likewise, Mr. Tenorio respectfully requests that this
Court reverse his forgery conviction. Because Mr. Tenorio pled to both counts as
charged on advice of ineffective counsel and was not advised by counsel that Utah law
supported that his charges included a lesser included offense, he was prejudiced. See
Dean, 2004 UT 63,^22.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY ACCEPTING
THE GUILTY PLEA TO FORGERY WHEN THE FACTS OUTLINED AT THE PLEA
HEARING DID NOT SUPPORT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A FORGERY CHARGE
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PERSONALLY ENSURE THAT MR.
TENORIO UNDERSTOOD THE FACTS OF HIS CASE IN RELATION TO THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGES.
The trial court committed plain error when accepting the guilty plea for the
forgery charge contravening Rule 11 because there was not a factual basis for forgery and
the trial court did not personally ensure on the record that Mr. Tenorio understood the
nature of the elements of forgery in relation to the facts of this case. Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 states in relevant part:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11(2005).
This Court has stated in reference to the mandates of Rule 11: "there are situations
in which a trial court must refuse a defendant's guilty plea because it is duty-bound to
protect a criminal defendant's constitutional rights," State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, K
22, 128 P.3d 1. "The trial court has an important role to play in assessing the
appropriateness of a proffered plea agreement....'" State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, «[f 14,
122 P.3d 571. "The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights and
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004
UT63,^9,95P.3d276.
Utah Courts have "described the trial court's duty in this regard as a duty of 'strict
compliance,' [and] have also declared that strict compliance 'does not mandate a
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed.1" Id. In addition, "[p]lea affidavits
or plea statements are properly used and incorporated into the record when the trial court
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determines that the defendant has read the affidavit or statement, understands its contents,
and acknowledges those contents." Id.
Nevertheless, the strict compliance standard requires that the trial court
"personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights and understood the elements of the crime." State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372
(Utah 1996). "It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make their clients fully
understand the contents of the affidavit." State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 775 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). Thus, the "affidavit should be only a starting point, not an end point, in the
pleading process." Id.
Also, "in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of the
crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of the
law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be truly voluntary.'" Thurman, 911
P.2d at 373. "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).
The plain error exception to the general preservation rule "enables the appellate
court to 'balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.'" State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 13, 10 P.3d 346(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122
n.12 (Utah 1989)). "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
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outcome for the appellant.'" Larsen, 2005 UT App 2 0 1 4 3 (quoting Dean, 2004 UT
63,^j 15)(other citations omitted). In cases such as this one, where the facts do not
support the forgery charge of which Mr. Tenorio pled guilty at the advice of his attorney
and that same attorney represented him until sentencing and the trial court accepted such
plea, review under plain error is necessary in the interests of justice and fundamental
fairness. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [Utah courts] to avoid
injustice." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 1f 13(citations omitted)
The trial court neither strictly complied with the mandates of R
Rule 11 personally on the record nor through the plea affidavit because the state
presented insufficient facts to support the charge of forgery. Rule 11 requires the trial
court to personally establish on the record that "the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered" and that "there is a factual basis for
the plea." Utah R. Crim. P 11. In order to establish a forgery charge, the state was
required to prove:
(2)

A person is guilty of forgery, if with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
so such original existed.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-50 l(1999)(emphasis added). In addition, Utah case law
construing this statute, establishes that one cannot be convicted of forgery if he or she
signs the relevant document with his or her own name and is not purporting to be another
person with the same name. See State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467.
Rule 11 states that a "factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction." In this case there was neither proof that the
defendant actually committed forgery, nor did the state have sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction of forgery.
The trial court explained the elements to Mr. Tenorio at the plea hearing as
follows:
By your plea - and let me just get to the information here - by your plea, you
would be admitting that beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake
County you devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and the
Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them money, property, or
anything else of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions. And you communicated directly or indirectly
with other people in order to execute or conceal the scheme. What's more, in
connection with the scheme, you obtained property that was worth more than $
5,000.
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a
purpose to defraud or understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the act of somebody else.
Id. at 27(emphasis added). While the trial court attempted to explain the facts in relation
to the elements of the communications fraud, it did not attempt the same thing for the
forgery charge. This is salient because the facts simply did not support the elements of
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forgery, but the topic is glossed over at every stage of the criminal proceedings against
Mr. Tenorio. Mr. Tenorio was always told that he "forged" the social security card by his
own attorney, by the state, and by the trial court. There was no explanation of how the
specific facts of his case supported forgery. At the plea hearing the trial court attempted
to establish a factual basis for the forgery as follows:
Trial Court: Whose social security card is he using?
State:

Your Honor, it belongs to an individual back in New York who passed
away in the year 2001. I can give you the exact name (inaudible).

Trial Court: Okay. So basically he obtained illegally information about, private facts
about an individual and used those numbers and that information to adopt
that individual's identity?
State:

Yes, your honor. I think what actually happened is upon arriving in this
country he purchased a social security number off the streets and received a
social security card that he then used to obtain employment and
subsequently -

Trial Court: Using his own name but this fake social security number, this other
person's, deceased person's social security number.
State:

At that point in time the person was still alive I guess, since deceased. In
1999 he used that number which is the basis of this charge. He presented a
forged social security card and represented that number to be his own in
order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently
defaulted on. After that in 2001, the actual owner of that number did pass
away.

Id. at 22.
Any time the state attempted to establish the forgery elements with facts, it merely
stated the social security card was forged without establishing the facts necessary to
support that statement. For instance, the state explained the forgery charge as follows:
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"[i]n 1999 he used that number which is the basis of this charge. He presented a forged
social security card and represented that number to be his own in order to obtain a HUD
guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently defaulted on." Id.
Similarly, later the state attempted to establish facts necessary to support the guilty
plea, but it never explained the forgery charge, rather it merely assumed all elements
were present:
What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that. The loan packet included that
social security number within it and the defendant signed indicating it was indeed
his social security number. Id. at 28-29.
The trial court found on this basis "[a] 11 right. Those facts support the plea that
has been entered. Accordingly I'm going to accept this plea as a knowing and voluntary
plea." Id. This is critical because if the state attempted or the trial court required a
factual basis for the guilty plea to forgery, it would have been impossible to establish
because Mr. Tenorio signed his own name to the social security card. Thus, while his
actions may have supported some other charge, they did not support the plain language of
the forgery statute, nor the established case law as is developed supra.
Mr. Tenorio does not speak English and all the proceedings were conducted
through the use of an interpreter. It was imperative that the trial court strictly comply
with rule 11 to ensure that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea and that Mr.
Tenorio understood the elements of the charges in relation to those facts. Rather than
explaining the elements of forgery and establishing a factual basis for a forgery
conviction, the trial court, the state, and Mr. Tenorio's own attorney simply told him he
forged a social security card. While the trial court granted Mr. Tenorio extra time to
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review the plea affidavit with the aid of the interpreter, the plea affidavit similarly failed
to establish the elements of the forgery charge with a factual basis.
Utah courts have stated that the sufficient affidavit would contain the following:
(1) a list of the names and the degrees of the crimes charged; (2) a statement of the
elements of the offenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish
the elements of the crime charged', (4) the allowable punishment for the crimes
charged and note the possibility of consecutive sentences for multiple crimes;
(5) the rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; (6) the details of any plea
bargain with a disclaimer that any sentencing recommendations may not be
followed; (7) the defendant's ability to read and understand the English
language; (8) the defendant's competency; and (9) the absence of any
inducements to influence the defendant's plea.
Phams, 798 P.2d at 775(emphasis added). However, the plea affidavit did not enumerate
the elements of forgery in relation to facts supporting those elements. The plea affidavit
contained the same language that merely assumed a forgery as the state used:
I presented a forged social security card to a mortgage lender and represented that
the number belonged to me to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan in the amount of
$83,871 to purchase a house.
R. 161-173; See Plea Affidavit at Addendum C. In addition, the plea affidavit is not
initialed after each paragraph that explains Mr. Tenorio's rights and it is not completely
filled out. Thus, the trial court did not personally establish on the record, nor through the
plea affidavit, that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements of the forgery charge and did not
ensure that there was a factual basis to support those elements. Utah courts have
determined that "in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of
the crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of
the law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be truly voluntary.'" Thurman,
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911 P.2d at 373 (citation omitted). As such, the trial court erred to strictly comply with
rule 11 and this Court should reverse and remand in order to allow Mr. Tenorio to
withdraw his guilty plea. As is established supra the case law on the forgery law was
long-standing and established in Utah such that the error was obvious and because Mr.
Tenorio pled guilty to all counts as charged without a factual basis or without the court
personally ensuring that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements in relation to the facts, and
because Mr. Tenorio pled guilty to both counts as charged, such error was harmful.
POINT III. THIS COURT CAN REVIEW MR. TENORIO'S GUILTY PLEA
CONVICTION FOR PLAIN ERROR, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. AND
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
To the extent current interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) precludes
review of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, plain error review for Rule 11
violations, and cases of exceptional circumstances on direct appeal for failure to timely
move to withdraw the guilty plea, such interpretation violates the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution which guarantees the right to counsel, violates the due
process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents Rule 11 protections for
defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal. This Court has the power to
reach these issues. The Utah Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal
from the judgment of conviction that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty
plea proceeding or assess a guilty plea for ineffective assistance. While the supreme
court did indicate in dictum in State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630 that it lacked
jurisdiction to address Reyes' challenge to his guilty plea because Reyes did not file a
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timely motion to withdraw that guilty plea, Reyes was not before the Court on direct
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Instead, Reyes filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure at some point after judgment was entered. Reyes,
2002 UT 13, ^f 2. Reyes appealed from a denial of his Rule 22(e) motion and attempted
to attack his guilty plea even though Rule 22(e) pertains only to a sentence. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 22; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995)(rule 22(e) does not allow
appellate courts to consider legality of conviction; review is limited to legality of
sentence). Because the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 22(e) to review the
sentence only, the supreme court in Reyes likewise had jurisdiction to review only the
sentencing claim and could not reach the legality of the conviction due to the procedural
posture of the case.
Because there was controlling case law that precluded it from reaching the legality
of the conviction since the case involved an appeal of the denial of a rule 22(e) motion,
the supreme court stated:
Reyes nonetheless argues that under State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 314 (Utah
1998), we can review a guilty plea, regardless of whether a motion to withdraw the
plea was filed, if plain error or exceptional circumstances exist. In making this
argument, Reyes overlooks the fact that we decided Marvin using the preamendment version of section 77-13-6, under which the filing of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea was an issue of preservation, not, as is now the case, an
issue of jurisdiction. Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318. This court may choose to review
an issue not properly preserved for plain error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
1f 11, 10 P.3d 346. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over which
it has no jurisdiction.

Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4.
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Given the procedural posture of Reyes, that is, an appeal from a denial of a Rule
22(e) motion rather than a direct appeal from the conviction, the supreme court did not
have jurisdiction to conduct a plain error review of Reyes5 guilty plea. See Brooks, 908
P.2d at 861 (appellate review of denial of Rule 22(e) motion is limited to review of the
legality of the sentence; appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the legality
of a conviction when defendant appeals from denial of a Rule 22(e) motion); State v.
Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, H 14, 84 P.3d 1193 (same). Under Rule 22(e) circumstances, as
the Reyes court pointed out, a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have been required
and the Court could not use the plain error doctrine to create jurisdiction to conduct
appellate review over the guilty plea conviction. Because Reyes was not on direct appeal
from the judgment of conviction, however, it did not hold that when a case is on direct
appeal from the judgment of conviction the appellate court cannot review the conviction
for plain error or ineffective assistance, and to the extent the language in Reyes is
interpreted to preclude review on direct appeal from a conviction, it is dictum.
Indeed, while an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a guilty plea
conviction for plain error or ineffective assistance when a defendant appeals from the
denial of a Rule 22(e) motion, it does have jurisdiction to review a conviction when a
defendant appeals directly from the judgment of conviction. In circumstances where a
defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, the appellate court has jurisdiction to
conduct the appeal pursuant to regular rules of appellate procedure, which should include
the ability to review the case for plain error or ineffective assistance. Unlike Reyes
where the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the plea because the
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defendant was appealing from a denial of a Rule 22(e) motion, in this case where Mr.
Tenorio appealed directly from his judgment of conviction, this Court has appellate
jurisdiction to review his conviction for plain error, ineffective assistance, or exceptional
circumstances.
Reyes did not address a whole line of cases post-Marvin where the Utah Court of
Appeals had previously stated the rule in the withdrawal statute was jurisdictional, but
still allowed for plain error and exceptional circumstances review. See State v.
Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, Tf 11, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, If 8,
996 P.2d 1065; State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). After the
decision in Reyes was rendered this Court commented: "[t]he supreme court recently
eliminated this exception to the jurisdictional rule, [permitting review for the aboveenumerated categories] stating that because the appellant failed to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court lacked jurisdiction to address his challenge to the plea,
even for plain error." State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, If 7, 57 P.3d 1106. To the extent
Reyes is interpreted to preclude plain error or ineffective assistance review of guilty plea
convictions on direct appeal, such an interpretation is incorrect since unlike the situation
in Reyes, an appellate court does have jurisdiction to review a conviction when a
defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.
The supreme court decision in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 19, 114 P.3d 585
likewise did not hold that an appellate court that has jurisdiction to review a conviction
and sentence based on the timely filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment cannot
use the regular tools of review, including ineffective assistance, plain error, and
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exceptional circumstances. In fact, the defendant in Merrill did not appeal from the
judgment of conviction and instead, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial
court several months after his conviction was final. Id. at ^ 9. After the trial court
dismissed the motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not timely, the defendant
appealed from that dismissal. Id. at ^ 11. Although the supreme court held that the thirty
day requirement creates a jurisdictional bar for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
in the trial court, it did not hold that when a defendant directly appeals from a judgment
of conviction, the appellate court cannot use the regular tools of appellate review in
reviewing that conviction.
Indeed, in Merrill the supreme court acknowledged the "imperfect lineage" of the
dictum in the Reyes decision. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 19. However, the Court
supported Reyes as precedent without analyzing the vulnerability of Reyes as precedent
because the party in that case did not directly address the underpinnings of Reyes. Id.
This Court should clarify Reyes to the extent that its dictum has been interpreted to
prevent direct review in cases that deny a defendant the right to the effective assistance of
counsel, plain error, and exceptional circumstances review.
Although the supreme court has never directly held that a Utah appellate court
cannot review a guilty plea conviction for plain error or ineffective assistance when a
defendant timely appeals from a judgment of conviction, this Court has held that a guilty
plea in a case on direct appeal cannot be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance
unless the defendant has filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea in the trial
court (see e.g. State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, 40 P.3d 646 (holding that this court
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lacked jurisdiction to review guilty plea for ineffective assistance where defendant did
not file a timely motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 360
(unpublished)(same); State v. King, 2004 UT App 79 (unpublished)(same); State v.
Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106 (same but additionally holding no plain error
review exception anymore according to Reyes decision); those holdings should be
overruled because they deprive a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, his due process and rule 11 rights as well as his right under the Sixth
Amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution to a full and fair appeal.
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const,
amend. VI. Likewise, a defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
at all critical stages of the prosecution." State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 400 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)(citation omitted). "With respect to this right, '[i]t has long been recognized that
the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" Salt Lake City v.
Grotepas, 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995)(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)).
The right to assistance of counsel is required on direct appeal if a state chooses to
create appellate review. See Douglas v. People, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814 (1963).
Specifically the Utah Constitution provides that in criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to counsel and "to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, §12; U.S.
Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). In State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated the right to appeal is essential to a fair proceeding.
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"Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully protected by the courts.
We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited." Id. at 704. The United States Supreme
Court states: "[t]he right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial
system of criminal justice." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985).
Utah courts acknowledge "three instances in which an appellate court may address
an issue for the first time on appeal: (1) where the appellant establishes that the trial court
committed 'plain error'; (2) where 'exceptional circumstances' exist; or (3) in some
situations, where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal." State
v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ^ 18, 122 P.3d 566, 570 (citations omitted). The underpinning
of all three of these exceptions is to avoid manifest injustice in certain types of cases. See
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [Utah courts]
to avoid injustice." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 13. Additionally, "[t]he purpose of rule 11
is to ensure that defendants know their rights and understand the basic consequences of
their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 9. Thus, these procedural
protections ensure fairness of the system that comport with the demands of due process.
Those asking Utah appellate courts to "overturn prior precedent have a substantial
burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This burden is
"mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis." Id. This doctrine is a "cornerstone of the
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the
fairness of adjudication." Id. (citation omitted). Appellate courts will overturn prior
precedent if the petitioner can show that "the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer
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sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by
departing from precedent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. A rule that practically works to
deny defendant's constitutionally mandated rights was originally erroneous and should be
overturned.
In this case, Mr. Tenorio was represented by the same ineffective counsel who
advised him to plead guilty to all counts as charged four days prior to trial and at
sentencing when counsel attempted to withdraw. R.276. In order for Mr. Tenorio to
comply with the time limit in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), his counsel would have
had to make a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance.
Utah courts have acknowledged that for this very purpose, review of certain claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel that may be technically precluded under jurisdictional or
preservation rules, should be allowed on direct review. "The law will not assume that
counsel has advised his client of his inadequacies or those of his associates." State v.
Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980).
The law recognizes that the right to assistance of counsel is necessary for fair
proceedings against a defendant. The average defendant is not in a position to understand
the sophisticated intricacies of the law and the criminal justice system to have a fair
proceeding without the effective assistance of counsel. "The right to counsel is a
fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy,
of our adversary process." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S.Ct. 2574
(1986)(quoting Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 l.ed.2d 799
(1963)). "[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
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sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial."
U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). "The centrality of the right to
counsel among the rights accorded a criminal defendant is self-evident: '[o]f all the rights
that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.'" Brescia v.
New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, 94 S.Ct. 2630 (1974)(quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). As such, "[d]efense counsel has duty
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 s.ct. 2052 (1984).
Because of the importance of these rights, the supreme court has determined that a
criminal defendant, who has failed to file a timely notice of appeal due to counsel's
ineffective assistance, may be resentenced in the original trial court so that his right to
appeal may run from the entry of the new judgment. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,
37-38 (Utah 1981); Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87,1f 10, 89 P.3d 196 (stating that if
a defendant has been denied the right to appeal, Utah law recognizes that "in certain
limited circumstances a defendant should be resentenced in order to revive [that] right.").
The basic policy behind courts fashioning exceptions to rules that bar review in these
type of cases is that courts do not expect that ineffective counsel will advise his client of
his or her ineffectiveness. See Smith, 621 P.2d at 699.
Interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) to preclude direct appellate review in
cases of ineffective assistance of counsel where the same counsel represented defendant
when he entered his guilty plea and at sentencing denies defendant the right to receive the
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assistance of counsel at all critical proceedings where the right to counsel is
constitutionally mandated. While a defendant can seek review based on ineffective
assistance of counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 under the Post-Conviction Relief
Act and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, this does not remedy the constitutional defect
since the defendant is not entitled to court appointed counsel, bears the burden of proof,
and is subject to other procedural rules that could preclude review. Likewise, because a
defendant cannot bring all rule 11 plain error violations in post-conviction relief, that
claim could also be foreclosed. See Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, Tf 17, 88 P.3d
353 (quoting Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)).
As the policy behind the right to the assistance of counsel acknowledges,
assistance of counsel is essential to fair proceedings against a defendant who is unskilled
in the nuances of the law. While a trial court may grant assistance of counsel for
collateral proceedings, appointment of counsel in this context is entirely discretionary and
cannot cure the denial of assistance of counsel at the plea hearing, sentencing, and direct
appeal. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991)(quoting
Pennsylvania v.Finlev, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987)(other
citation omitted))( "[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings."). Nor is there a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings. See id.
Thus, a defendant who was erroneously advised by ineffective counsel to plead
guilty and is represented by that same counsel at sentencing, is never able to receive
effective assistance of counsel for redress because the current interpretation of law
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precludes this issue from direct review. For the same reason this procedural difficulty
results in a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it also qualifies as a rare
procedural anomaly under the exceptional circumstances review courts provide to avoid
manifest injustice. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(discussing
exceptional circumstances doctrine.).
The bar to review in cases of ineffective assistance, plain error, and exceptional
circumstances cases when the defendant pled guilty, but can show constitutional error at
the trial level and did not move to withdraw the guilty plea because of that constitutional
defect, leaves a defendant without the right and benefit to a full and fair appeal. The
"Sixth Amendment rights of accused in all criminal prosecutions to . . . have assistance of
counsel for his defense are part of the 'due process of law' that is guaranteed by
Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of state." Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975).
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Robert Osorio Tenorio respectfully requests that this Court
reverse this case and remand to the trial court to enter.
SUBMITTED this £ °

day of March, 2006.

^ . <B>^^^)\JU?^
JOSiE E. BRUMFIELD
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041904383 FS

ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENISE P LINDBERG
July 22, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
micheldb
Prosecutor: HAMP, RICHARD G
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCGREGOR GUELKER, MARIANNE
Interpreter: GLORIA UPDEGROVE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: spanish
Date of birth: May 6, 1972
Video
Tape Number:
7/22/05
Tape Count: 10:20:24
CHARGES
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Restitution
Amount: $50817.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: HUD

T5^i<^f<-N

"1

Case No: 041904383
Date:
Jul 22, 2005

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
Submit to deportation or leave the country voluntarily within 10
days of release.
Do not re-enter the country illegally.
3 6 months good behavior probation.
Defendant to self surrender to ICE by 8/3/05 for deportation.
Restititon ordered in the amount of $50817.
Defendant not to remain in the US illegally or not to_re-enter the
US or Utah illegally.
Bench warrant to issue on 8/4/05 for $100,000
Dated this JZ(

day of

DE&IS
Distric

Paqe 2 (last)

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041904383 FS

ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENISE P LINDBERG
July 22, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
micheldb
Prosecutor: HAMP, RICHARD G
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCGREGOR GUELKER, MARIANNE
Interpreter: GLORIA UPDEGROVE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: Spanish
Date of birth: May 6, 1972
Video
Tape Number:

7/22/05

Tape Count:

10:20:24

CHARGES

1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Restitution
Amount: $50817.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: HUD

p^rr*=>
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Case No: 041904383
Date:
Jul 22, 2005

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
Submit to deportation or leave the country voluntarily within 10
days of release.
Do not re-enter the country illegally.
3 6 months good behavior probation.
Defendant to self surrender to ICE by 8/3/05 for deportation.
Restititon ordered in the amount of $50817.
Defendant not to remain in the US illegally or not to re-enter the
US or Utah illegally.
Bench warrant to issue on 8/4/05 for $100,000 if the defendant
fails to self report.
Dated this

day of

, 20

.

DENISE P LINDBERG
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303
76-1-303, Time limitations for fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation —
Misconduct of public officer or employee.
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution may
be commenced for any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a
breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved
party and who is himself not a party to the offense.
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in
Section 76-1-302 by more than three years.
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has expired, a
prosecution may be commenced for:
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or public
employee:
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or during the
period of his public employment; or
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office or public
employment.
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsection (3) shall not extend
the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501
76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a
government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing

representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or
claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as
provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense
described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of
value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over;
or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and
written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may
not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a
motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no
contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EN LA CORTE DEL TERCER DISTRITO JUDICIAL
CONDADO DE LAGO SALADO, ESTADO DE UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
ESTADO DE UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Parte Acusadora,

AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO EN
APOYO DE LA DECLARACION DE
CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO
DEL ASESOR JURIDICO
Case No. :
Numero del caso:

vs.
contra

RPWA

Ofx>r\G ~XeM.or\n
Judge: Denise Posse Lindberg
Juez:

Defendant.
Acusado.

_, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
I,
advised of and that I understand the following facts and nghts:
Yo5
, por medio de la presente reconozco y
certifico que se me ha informado de los siguientes hechos y derechos y que los
entiendo.
Notification of Charges
Notification de Cargos
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Me declaro culpable (o sin disputa) de los siguientes delitos:

1

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
_Los elementos del (de los) delito(s) del (de los) cual(es) me declaro culpable (o sin
disputa) son los siguientes:

_J£
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I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):
Entiendo que al declararme culpable, estare admitiendo que cometi los delitos
citados anteriormente. (O si me declaro sin disputa, que no disputo que haya cometido
susodichos delitos). Estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o si me declaro sin disputa, no
disputo ni recuso) que los siguientes hechos describen mi conducta y la conducta de
otras personas por las cuales tengo responsabilidad penal. Estos hechos proveen el
fundamento para que la corte acepte mis declaraciones de culpabilidad (o sin disputa)
y comprueban los elementos del (del los) delito(s) por el (los) cual(es) me declaro
culpable (o sin disputa):

Tianslaiion Appioved by Admuusii alive Office ofihe Courts

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Si he renunciado a mi derecho a asesoria, certifico que he leido esta afirmacion
y que entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos de las acusaciones y de los delitos de los
cuales me declaro culpable (o sin disputa). Tambien entiendo mis derechos en este caso
y en otros casos y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaracion(es) de culpabilidad (o sin
disputa).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
.
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho a asesoria, mi abogado(a) es
.
Mi abogado(a) y yo hemos hablado a fondo sobre esta afirmacion, mis derechos y las
consecuencias de mi(s) declaracion(es) de culpabilidad (o sin disputa).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Juicio por Jurado. Se que tengo el derecho a un juicio publico y sin demora ante
un jurado imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que al declararme culpable (o sin disputa)
renuncio a ese derecho.

Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Careo y contrainterrogatorio de testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio'por jurado:
a) tendria el derecho de ver y observar a los testigos que testificaran en contra de mi
y b) mi abogado o yo, si renunciara al derecho de tener abogado, tendriamos la
oportunidad de contrainterrogar a todos los testigos que testificaran en contra di mi.

Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those costs.
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Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, 1 would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilt)' (or no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal mv sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after mv sentence is
entered.
Recurso de Apelacion. Se que bajo la Constitution de Utah, si un jurado o un
juez me condenara, tendrfa el derecho de apelar mi condena y el castigo. Si yo no
pudiera costear los gastos de una apelacion el Estado me los pagaria. Si me declaro
culpable (o sin disputa) entiendo que estoy renunciando al derecho de apelar mi
condena. Entiendo que si deseo apelar mi condena, tendria que levantar notification
de la apelacion dentro de los 30 dias despues que se haya asentado mi condena.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Se y entiendo que al declararme culpable abandono y renuncio a todos los
derechos estatutarios v constitucionales explicados anteriormente.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Consecuencias de Presentar una Declaracion de Culpablilidad (o Sin Disputa)

Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
Penas potenciales. Se cual es la sentencia maxima que se me podria imponer por
cada delito del cual me declare culpable (o sin disputa). Al declararme culpable (o sin
disputa) de un delito queconlleva una condena obligatoria, seque me someto a cumplir
con la condena obligatoria de ese delito. Se que puede que mi condena incluya un
periodo de prision, una multa, o ambos,

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my

7
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declarators negociado, si hubiera alguna, se encuentran en su totalidad en esta
afirmacion, incluso las que se explican a continuation:
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Trial judge not bound, I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
_E1 juez de primera instancia no esta obligado. Se que el juez no esta obligado
a aceptar ninguna acusacion, concesion condenatoria, recomendacion de libertad
condicional, condena suspendida o incluso la reduction de los cargos cuando se
imponga la condena, aunque estas hayan sido presentadas o soiicitadas por el asesor
juridico defensor o el abogado acusador. Se tambien que el juez no esta obligado a

WH

I am
years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
Tengo
anos de edad. He asistido a la escuela hasta el
aiio.
Puedo leer y entender el idioma ingles. Si no entiendo el ingles se me ha facilitado un
interprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o
estupefaciente que pudiera perjudicar mi juicio cuando decidi declararme culpable.
En este momento no me encuentro bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento
o estupefaciente que podria perjudicar mi juicio.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
Considero que estoy en pleno uso de mis facultades y de mi capacidad mental
para comprender estos procesos y las consecuencias de mi declaracion. No padezco de
ningiin trastorno, defecto o deterioro mental que me impediria comprender lo que
estoy haciendo o presentar mi declaracion consciente, inteligente y voluntariamente.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only
be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be
pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a and Rule
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Entiendo que si deseo retirar rni(s) declaracionfes) de culpabilidad (o de no
disputar) debo Ievantar un pedimento escrito para retirar mi(s) declaracion(es) antes
que se pronuncie la condena. Entiendo que para una declaracion mantenida en
suspenso, habria que Ievantar un pedimento para retirar el convenio declaratorio
dentro de los 30 dias despues de haberme declarado culpable o sin disputa. Solo se me
permitiria retirar mi declaracion si demostrara que no se presento la declaracion
consciente v voluntariamente. Entiendo que si hubiera alguna recusacion a mi(s)
declaracionfes) que se levantara despues de la imposicion de la condena. habria que
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
Certificado del Asesor Juridico Acusador
/*) *
/
* certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
t/fj M^TJ
^S^'ftf-*^ 4 ^ ^ T ~ : defendant. I have reviewed this Statement
of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court,„ There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest;
Certifico que soy el asesor juridico del Estado de Utah en el caso contra
__, el acusado* He revisado esta Afirmacion del
Acusadc) y Incuentro que el fundamento de hechps de la conducta delictiva del acusado
que constitute el (lbs) delito(s) es fiel y correcta. Al acusado no se le ha ofrecido
ningiin incentivo, amehaza ni coaccion indebido para instarle a presentar la
declaracioh. Las negociaciories dfeclaratorias figuran en su totalidad en la Afirmacion
y en el Convenio Declaratorio adjunio, <6 segun se ha suplido en ej acta ante la Corte.
Existen causas razonables para creer que las pruebas apoyarian la condena del
acusado del(de los) delito(s) por el(los) cual(es) la(s) declafaci6n(es) esta(estan)
presentada(s) y que la aceptacion de la(s) declaracion(es) serviria al iriteres publico.

ROSECUTING ATTORNEY
ASESOR JURIDICO ACUSADOR
5 'J.' . . - ^ A

:

^' '^%tf

•PX\

Bar No.

V ^ ^

Niirriero de matrfcula en el
Colegio de Abogados:
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ADDENDUM D

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 22, 2005
JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING
For the Plaintiff:

RICHARD G. HAMP

For the Defendant:

MARIANNE MCGREGOR GUELKER

Interpreter:

?

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

We are set on a final pretrial

erence and I am told that the parties have reached a plea
~~t-i

MS. GUELKER:
MR. HAMP:

Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the State anticipates the

ndant will be entering guilty pleas to Count 1, the
cations fraud alternative, the second degree felony
unt"' 2, the third degree forgery count.

We also have

lings-:, we have offered in order to reduce that plea.
^ ;• have, offered is contained in the statement of the
mt and I'll briefly (inaudible) that, mention those.
''- the State will not pursue additional charges for
Code violations.

The second is is that the State

^ pursue additional charges arising from identity
forgery charges which would arise from the
'^continued employment at Siegfried's Delicatessen
al security number that does not belong to him up
sentencing.

The purpose for that particular

-nation is the defendant would like to remain employed
19

in order to save up money to aid him in his trip back to
Mexico which is what we anticipate will happen.
The third thing the State is willing to do is
recommend as a sentencing recommendation that the defendant
receive a suspended jail and/or prison sentence in lieu of
deportation.
The fourth thing the State is going to recommend is
the defendant pay restitution in the form of receiving a
civil judgment in the amount of restitution which I've set
forth and it's $50,000.
THE COURT:
MR. HAMP:
Honor.

$50,000?
I can give you the exact figure, Your

$50,817 which would be in the favor of Housing and

Urban Development and —
THE COURT:

The Federal Department of Housing and

Urban Development?
MR. HAMP:

That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HAMP: Is there something I'm leaving out?
MS. GUELKER:

Did you say the part about the

concurrent sentences?
MR. HAMP:

Your Honor, that is correct.

The other

thing is we're going to recommend that he be sentenced
concurrently.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And Mr. Tenorio, the first thing
?0

r you need to understand is that any negotiations between

i
li

+

counsel m

terms of recommendations that would be made are

* only advisory to the Court.

That means that I am not bound

mi to follow them and I may very well disagree once I know more
Si

m

about these facts*

So, you need to understand that the

recommendations are just that.

They're recommendations and

I'm not bound by them.
5B8 H

MS. GUELKER:

Your Honor, also may (inaudible)

theft by deception?
MR. HAMP:

I*

I clarified the record.

Essentially,

the State's intent is to not pursue any charges that may
arise from his continued use of that social security number
to gain employment at Siegfried's Deli.

Iff

We don't want to

make it any broader than that, up until the point in time
that he is deported assuming that would evolve if the Court
opposes that type of sentence, that would be obvious.

If for

I1.

some reason he remained in this country, we will not make any

18

carte blanche permission for him to commit identity fraud for

19

all intense and purposes.

20

THE COURT:
MR. HAMP:

Whose social security card is he using?
Your Honor, it belongs to an individual

ir

t,
23

n

back in New York who passed away in the year 2001.

I can

give you the exact name (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Okay.

So basically he obtained

illegally information about, private facts about an

25

21

individual and used those numbers and that information to
adopt that individual's identity?
MR. HAMP:

Yes, Your Honor.

I think what actually

happened is upon arriving in this country he purchased a
social security number off the streets and received a social
security card that he then used to obtain employment and
subsequently —
THE COURT:

Using his own name but this fake social

security number, this other person's, deceased person's
social security number?
MR. HAMP:

At that point in time the person was

still alive I guess, since deceased.

In 1999 he used that

number which is the basis of this charge.

He presented a

forged social security card and represented that number to be
his own in order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house
which he subsequently defaulted on.

After that in 2001, the

actual owner of that number did pass away.
MS. GUELKER:

Your Honor, I'm going to say he's

been at the same job for nine years.

The house in question

was an error in judgment and part of a mortgage scheme that I
think about 200 persons were —
THE COURT:

I don't find that particularly

commendable or assisting in his —
MS. GUELKER:

He's a hard working person.

He is

going to be deported I think regardless of what sentence you

i

choose to propose.

2

that he lacked the intent to cause this and did not

3

intentionally default on a house.

4

and made various improvements.

5

unfortunately, could not —

g

Were we to argue this, we would argue

THE COURT:

He lived there for a year

It happened to many people

The issue is not that he intended to

7

default on the house.

8

in fact did use information that didn't belong to him to

9

secure a loan in which he then was unable to maintain, right?

10

MS. GUELKER:

The issue is that he intended to and

Well, obviously we would phrase it

11

differently but not being able to be in this country any

12

more, I have advised him of the consequences of coming back

L3

to this country after deportation is fatal.

14

he be forced to serve out whatever sentence he would have

15

remaining on these charges but then of course he would be in

16

serious trouble with the United States and would face

17

consequences separate from these charges here.

18

this country working hard, does not have a criminal record.

19

He basically is here working and lacked the intent to

20

defraud.

21 I

Not only would

He's been in

He was a —
THE COURT:

Well, if he lacked the intent to

22

defraud, why are we pleading?

23

and Mr. Tenorio is set for trial on Tuesday and he has the

24

right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury and let the

25

matter be a matter of proof for the State.

Why aren't we going to trial

MS. GUELKER:
H o n or,

Well, that is true.

Forgive me Your

are you asking me to - I know that my client if he

pleads guilty needs to make a statement to the Court about
what he is pleading guilty to.
THE COURT: Correct.
MS. GUELKER:

6

THE COURT:

7
8

MS. GUELKER:
THE COURT:

10

12

First of all, let me talk with Mr.

Tenorio, Osorio actually, right?

9

"11

We can do that.

Osorio Tenorio.
Mr. Osorio, do you understand that you

are set for trial this coming Tuesday and you would have the
right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury?

You would

13

have the right at trial to be represented by counsel.

It

14

would be the State's burden to prove you guilty of these

15

charges beyond a reasonable doubt and you would be presumed

16

innocent and the jury would be instructed that they must

17

begin the trial with that presumption.
At trial, you would have the right to confront and

18
19

cross examine witnesses against you, subpoena your own

20

witnesses to appear and testify and if a jury convicted you,

21

you would have a right to appeal. Now, by entering this

22

plea, you would be giving up many of those rights, most of

23

those rights and you would be severely limiting your appeal

24

rights.

25

that yellow document that your attorney has there that is

Now those rights are explained in more detail in

24

¥written in both English and Spanish.
u±o

Did you have a chance

read it or review it with you attorney?

Senior Onsorio?

fa*- **

1

MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):

(Inaudible)

because of my nerves.
u
THE COURT:

Do you want to have some additional

time to review what's in there because you are certainly
entitled to it.

I've told you in summary what it says but

you have the right to take a little bit longer and read it
and make sure you understand and fully comprehend all the
rights that you are giving up by entering this plea.
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):

Well,

[unintelligible].
THE COURT:

That may be the case but the issue is

that before I can accept your plea, I need to be sure that
you understand what are the rights that you are giving up by
accepting this plea.

So it's important because I cannot by

law accept your plea unless I am convinced that you
thoroughly understand what you're giving up and that you' re
entering this plea voluntarily.
minutes, sit down.

So why don't you take five

You can sit down with the interpreter if

you need some assistance and then I'd like you to review that
document.
MS. GUELKER:

We will do that, Your Honor.

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
THE COURT:

Have you had time now to review that
25

document, the plea form and did you understand everything
that was covered in there?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:
make sure Mr. Hamp.

All right.

Yes.

And you understand - let me

He's pleading to Counts 1 and 3?

MR. HAMP: Yes.
THE COURT:
MR. HAMP:

And you're dismissing Count 2?
There really isn't a Count 2.

He's

pleading to 1 and 2 the alternative —
THE COURT:

These are his alternatives.

I'm sorry.

We were showing them as three counts. Okay.
MR. HAMP:
THE COURT:

My apologies, Your Honor.
No, that's okay.

entered in our computer.
alternative.

It's the way it was

So it's count 1, count 2 was an

So he's pleading to it as communications fraud,

not as theft by deception?
MR. HAMP:

That is correct, Your Honor.

And Count

2 is the forgery.
THE COURT:

Okay.

These counts carry with them

maximum penalties of 1 to 15 year at the state prison with
respect to Count 1 and a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent
surcharge and a security fee.

Count 2, the forgery, is a

third degree felony that can serve a maximum penalty of 0 to
5 years at the state prison and a fine of $5,000 plus an 85
percent surcharge and a security fee.
26

By your plea - and let me just get to the
information here - by your plea, you would be admitting that
beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake County you
devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and
the Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them
money, property, or anything else of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions. And you communicated directly or
indirectly with other people in order to execute or conceal
the scheme. What's more, in connection with the scheme, you
obtained property that was worth more than $5,000.
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999
in Salt Lake County, with a purpose to defraud or
understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the
act of somebody else.

Do you understand that those are the

things you would be admitting?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

Yes.

Have you been promised anything other

than what Mr. Hamp has put on the record in order to get you
to enter this plea?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

No.

Is anybody forcing you into entering

this plea?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): No.
27

THE COURT:

Have you had sufficient time to discuss

this plea with your attorney?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

Yes.

Are you satisfied with the advice you

received?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

Yes.

Are you today under the influence of

alcohol, any drug, anything else that would effect your
ability to enter this plea?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

No.

I think I may have asked this already

but is anybody forcing you into doing this?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

No.

All right Mr. Osorio, with all that

information, do you still want to proceed and enter your plea
today to these charges?
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

All right.

Yes.

If you would then go ahead

and sign the plea form, we'll incorporate that into the
record.
First of all, I need to have Mr. Hamp add whatever
additional facts are necessary to support the plea?
MR. HAMP:

Your Honor, yes.

What the State's

evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant
presented a forged social security card, one that had not
28

been issued to him with a fake number on it in order to
obtain a loan.

He presented that to a mortgage loan officer

essentially with the representation that he was here legally
by presenting that card.

Relying upon that representation,

the mortgage loan officer then prepared a loan packet for him
and submitted that.

The loan packet included that social

security number within it and the defendant signed indicating
it was indeed his social security number.

That loan went

through the process for approximately two months during which
the defendant provided additional information like where he
worked.

That information also contained the social security

number on it. At the end of that period if then went to a
closing where again the defendant represented that that was
his social security number and the loan was closed.

The

mortgage officer nor the title officer would have proceeded
with any of it if they had known that that wasn't his social
security number and the loan would not have closed.

The loan

was closed, he received a loan in the amount of $80,000 some
odd which was HUD guaranteed.

He paid on that loan for a

period of time, I think it was approximately two years, I'm
not positive.

At that time the loan went into default and

the house was foreclosed and HUD honored their guaranteed and
paid out approximately $50,000 some odd which we have
specified the exact amount in the plea agreement.

That would

be the State's evidence.
29

THE COURT:

All right.

|>|ea that has been entered.
?his pl^a a s

a

Those facts support the

Accordingly I'm going to accept

knowing and voluntary plea.

Any attempt to

Withdraw this plea would have to be done in writing for good

It
feause. That is, you would have to give me a very good reason
why I should do it and needs to be made before you are

I
sentenced.

As of the time of sentencing, your ability to

Withdraw the plea terminates and that is jurisdictional bar.
What are we contemplating here?

Are we

anticipating - well, let me hear*
MR. HAMP:

Your Honor, it was going to be the

State's suggestion that we set sentencing downstream.
going to suggest a 30-day period.

I was

I don't know if the pre-

sentence report would necessarily give us much more
information than what we currently have; however, there are a
number of arrangements the defendant wanted to make in
anticipation that [unintelligible] and we certainly don't
mind giving him that time to do that.
THE COURT:

Why don't we set this for sentencing on

June 3rd because otherwise I'm going to be out of the country
and not back until July 1.
morning.

June 3rd then at 9:00 in the

I will see you then.
Yes, you will have the time to talk to me at the

time of sentencing.

Is there something you want to say to me

now?
30

MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes.
(Inaudible) the house.
THE COURT: About what?
MR. TENORIO: (through interpreter): (inaudible)
house.
THE COURT:

I think your attorney would prefer that

you speak at the time of sentencing.
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Well yes,
[unintelligible] same.
THE COURT:

Okay, I will see you on June 3.

you.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank

